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THE

HOUSE OF LOEDS

AND

THE NATION.

BY

PHILIP VERNON SMITH, MA,

BARRISTER- AT- LAW,

Laii Fellow of King^s College, Cambridge; Author of '^ History of the

English Institutions.'^

WITH

PREFACE by the EARL of CARNARVON.

[SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
ENGLAND OFFICE," 291, STRAND, W.C.

1884.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

PREFACE.

BY THE EARL OF CARNARVON.

I HAVE been requested to write a few words of introduction
to the following pamphlet on the House of Lords ; and it is an
agreeable task to bear witness to its singularly fair and truthful
reasoning. There is nothing from which I materially differ,
there is very much in which I cordially agree. In its
moderate and argumentative style, in its complete freedom
from personal abuse, unfair attack, or exaggerated statement, it
presents a remarkable contrast to articles and papers which
have lately been written against the House of Lords, and
which, by their injustice and violence, seem to drag us back
into the worst political literature of the last century.

I heartily and sincerely recommend it to the careful reading
of those who desire to know the facts of a case that has been
grossly misrepresented. They will find in it nothing, I believe,
that is not consistent with fact, and that has not the warrant
of History.

With prejudiced partisans I have no concern ; but to con-
scientious and reasonable men, who desire to be satisfied as to
the rights of the question, I would say, " Test the allega-
tions of Radical speakers and pamphleteers by the certain
facts of History, and study these facts not in the pages of Tory
writers but in the deliberate conclusions of Liberal Historians,
where there can be no suspicion of favour or partiality towards
the House of Lords." Is it possible to make a fairer proposal ?
And if indeed the offer be accepted and the question studied
from this point of view — of course I mean broadly and fairly,
not picking out exceptional sentences or facts, or divorcing the
general meaning of the writer from the context — it will, I

4 Preface,

think, be admitted that the reasoning of this pamphlet is amply
and abundantly confirmed.

Errors of judgment, intemperate conduct, perhaps even
selfish action may occasionally be traced in the parliamentary
history of the House of Lords ; but what body of men has there
ever been, or v^ill there be, of v^hich this cannot be said ? Un-
worthy members, rotten limbs which I wish we could cut off,
there have been and must be, but what body of men has there
ever been, or will there be, of which this cannot be said ? Let
him or they who are immaculate cast the first stone. If, in-
deed, individual cases are to be cited, it would be easy to
name by the score those in the House of Lords who have with
pre-eminent ability guided legislation and upheld public affairs,
or, on the other hand, who have simply and conscientiously
made their wealth and abilities the source of comfort and
happiness to thousands who depended upon them.

I believe that if, like reasonable men, and not like children,
carried away by every breath of rhetoric, we look dispassion-
ately at the whole course and conduct of the House of Lords
for many generations back, the verdict will be that that House
has shown often more liberality, very often more wisdom
than, and always as much patriotism as the House of Com-
mons.

The revolution of 1668 was as much due to the English
aristocracy and the House of Lords as to any man or men in
the country. In the early part of the i8th century it was the
House of Lords which threw its shield of protection over Lord
Somers, Sir Robert Walpole, and, on more than one occasion,
over the Dissenters too, though it may now suit Radical
politicians to ignore this. It was the House of Lords that
maintained the House of Hanover, and upheld the Protestant
succession. These were great events ; and compared with them
the events and legislation of our day will seem in the eyes of
a future historian to be insignificant and petty. Again, as we
consider the parliamentary history of the close of the iSth
century, it is neither demagogues nor members of the House

Preface, 5

of Commons, but great Peers that withstood the arbitrary
power of the Crown, or opposed Lord Bute and the corruption
of Henry Fox. The Dukes of Richmond and Devonshire,
Lord Fitzwilliam, and others, were at one time the mainstay
and representatives of public liberty, and the bulwark against
an overweening court and a servile minister. Go on yet one
step further, to that great war when a Liberal Opposition
thwarted the military conduct of the Duke of Wellington, and
did their best to starve the British army abroad ; and it was
the House of Lords that never flinched when the honour,
credit, and safety of the country were at stake. And on
the conclusion of that great struggle it will not be found that
the aristocratic government of England were the friends of
tyranny abroad. On the contrary, their support was given
to the constitutional Governments that were growing up in
Europe. Misrepresentation and abuse have been heaped upon
Lord Castlereagh, but modern history has brought out the
fact that he was no friend to tyranny. Nor must it be
forgotten that, at the end of the great war, 'it was that
same aristocratic government that restored Sicily to the
Italians, Java to the Dutch, that defended Holland under
critical circumstances, and did its best, though unsuccessfully,
to save Poland. It was finally no demagogue who carried the
famous Reform Bill of 1832. It was an aristocratic govern-
ment, at the head of which was one, than whom no greater
aristocrat breathed — Lord Grey.

There are, I think, four undeniable facts which may be
asserted of the House of Lords during the last half century.
First, a steady growth and adaptation of the House to the
social and political changes of the time may be traced. It
reflects, indeed, our essentially English practice in silently and
unconstrainedly adapting itself to the requirements of the day.
It has thus interwoven itself, as it were, with English senti-
ment, and had become an integral part of the English nation.
Secondly, by the general opinion of the country, and on the
authority of distinguished Liberals, it may challenge, for ability

6^ Pveface,

in debate and for business power, comparison with the House
of Commons. Thirdly, it remains a firm bulwark of the
Crown ; and, whilst a bulwark — thanks to its hereditary
character — it has maintained its independence of the Crown.
Fourthly, and lastly, taking all circumstances into account,
there has been a remarkable and extraordinary harmony be-
tween the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

Let me only add that all this can be proved, not from the
pages of Conservative writers, but from the careful conclusions
of Liberal historians. I might pursue this reasoning further,
and point out how untrue it is to represent the House of Lords
as a mere Conservative assembly. Up to the reign of
George HL the House of Lords was Whig; but with the
French Revolution it changed — and why ? Because it reflected
the character and temper of the whole nation. At that time
the whole nation was Tory. It was alarmed by the atrocities
of the French Revolution, and the House of Lords reflected
faithfully the temper of the nation. But after the Reform
Bill of 1832, parties in the House of Lords gradually
became more evenly balanced — so evenly balanced, indeed,
that during the time Lord Palmerston was Prime Minister
it was hard to say that the Conservative Opposition was stronger
than the Liberal Government. When a vote of censure
was moved by the late Lord Derby, on the occasion
of the Chinese war, the Conservative Opposition were beaten
by ■^'] votes. But, if the House of Lords is Conservative now,
the reason is plain. It is the present Government that has
alarmed the House, and has driven over from the Liberal
to the Conservative side men who, from father to son,
have been Liberal. It is that the House of Lords is
reflecting now, as it did at the French Revolution, the educa-
tion, the sense, the respectability, the good feeling, the
intelligence of the country.

But it is objected that the House of Lords is founded on the
principle of hereditary descent, and that that principle is incon-
sistent with the ideas of our day. Inconsistent with the ideas

^

^ UIUC .

Preface. 7

of our day ! It might as well be said inconsistent with the
moving principles of human nature ; for it is in that hereditary
principle that the appeal to many of men's highest instincts
lies. A man toils not for himself, but for his son ; for him he
spends his life, and strength, and energy, as on him he pours
out his affections; and the son, in his turn, when he succeeds
to his father's place, succeeds not to his wealth and property
alone, but to that which is the best part of his inheritance,
to his fair fame and credit. That fair fame is the pledge of his
future conduct and the earnest of good service to the State.
It may be said, in Lord Bacon's words, that the Peers, if true
to themselves and their duties, are " thrice servants — servants
of the Sovereign or State, servants of fame, and servants of
business."

But it is also on this hereditary principle that the independence
of the House of Lords is founded. Take it away, and I know
not what substitute can be found. Nomination ? It has been
repeatedly tried in our Colonies, but no colonial statesman
would recommend it, except as the next best substitute for our
English system, which is of course impossible there. Election ?
It has also been tried and it has been found even less satis-
factory in its operation than nomination. A constitution analo-
gous to that of the Senate of the United States ? It is
admitted that the materials do not exist in this country.

Whilst, then, I say now, as I have often said before, that
I would refuse consideration to no wise or well considered pro-
posal which would give strength or greater efficiency to our
second chamber, it needs little knowledge of human nature, of
History or statesmanship, to understand that they, who lightly
discard the principle of hereditary descent, may find that they
have cast aside that which even under the freest and most
popular institutions may have a value little dreamed of by
modern Liberals. Surrounded by the traditions of historic
antiquity — no small merit in days of change — it maintains a
visible connection between past and present England ; and it
adds dignity to an ancient monarchy, stability to the forms

8 Preface,

and substance of government, and a silent, but not ineffective
protest against those less generous influences which are ever
striving to assert themselves in a money making and money
worshipping generation,

CARNARVON.
August 2othf 1884.

THE HOUSE OF LORDS & THE NATION.

«,, .. The recent action of the majority of the Peers,

in dispute. ^" declining to read the Franchise Bill a second
time while the Government Redistribution scheme
remains altogether undisclosed, has been made the occasion of
an outcry against the present constitution and powers of the
House of Lords. Some of those who join in it clamour for the
total abolition of the House, while others are content to insist
on its thorough reform, and on a considerable curtailment of
its powers. It is not the first occasion in our history that this
outcry has been heard. As is well known, the last time that
it was seriously raised was during the agitation which pre-
ceded the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832. There is a
singular contrast between the circumstances of that epoch and
those of the present day. Then it was the party- of reform
who pressed upon the Peers " the Bill, the whole Bill, and
nothing but the Bill." Now it is the Peers, who, in requiring
that the plan for the extension of the franchise shall be accom-
panied by the scheme for the redistribution of seats, are
insisting on the measure, the whole measure, and nothing but
the measure. On the other hand, the motto of the Govern*
ment policy is in fact, at present, " the part, the little part,
and nothing but the part."

It is not difficult to decide on which side lie right and
reason. We need only refer to the words uttered five-and-
twenty years ago by that great authority on the subject of
reform, Mr. John Bright, when he laid it down as a maxim of
universal application, that it is the duty of Englishmen to
repudiate without mercy any Bill of any Government, what-
ever its franchise, whatever its seeming concessions may be, if
it does not contain provisions for a redistribution of seats.

But the political power of the Peers had been
the Common- ^^^ailed before the present century. In January,
wealth. 1649, the House of Commons passed a resolution

that the House of Peers was useless, dangerous,
and ought to be abolished ; and in the spring of that year,
within four months after King Charles I. had been brought to

B

10 The Lesson of the Commonwealth,

the scaffold, an ordinance was passed (which twelve years later
was unanimously condemned as utterly unconstitutional and
illegal) to the effect that England should be governed as a
Commonwealth by the representatives of the people in Parlia-
ment, without any King or House of Lords.

Let those who conceive that a similar measure at the
present day would be advantageous to the country, consult
-history as to what was the result of that proceeding two
hundred and fifty years ago. "Was the authority of the House
of Commons increased by the proceeding ? Was the country
benefited by it ? Scarcely had four years elapsed from the
time of its taking place, when he, who had been the ruling
spirit in accomplishing the overthrow of the Upper House,
found it expedient to do away with the Lower House also.
The power of the Commons, instead of being augmented by its
release from the check of a co-ordinate assembly, had become
absolutely effete. The House, which not many years before
had resented the intrusion of the King into its debates as
an unwarrantable breach of its privileges, tamely submitted
while Oliver Cromwell, with an armed force, interrupted its
proceedings. We all remember how he ordered the removal
of the Speaker's mace (which, through the degeneracy of the
House, had, in fact, become what he designated it, a mere
" bauble "), how he ejected the members, and locked the doors.
After this Cromwell made one or two further attempts to
govern the country with a House of Commons alone. But
success did not attend the experiment. He had recourse
a second time to a body of soldiers to disperse the country's
legislators; and the newly elected House, which met in
1654, was allowed so little freedom that every member
was stopped at the door by an armed guard and refused
admission until he had subscribed a declaration that he would
not vote for any alteration in the government. When another
election took place in 1657, upwards of a hundred of the repre-
sentatives returned by the constituencies were regarded by
Cromwell as disaffected towards himself, and were prohibited
by him from taking their seats.* It is instructive to notice
that so convinced did he at last become of the impracticability

* This is the period referred to by Sir Wilfrid Lawson in St. James's
Hall, on August 9th, 1884, when he reminded his hearers that *' We had
got on very well without the House of Lords for nine years during the
Commonwealth, and had never been more prosperous." So much for
Radical interpretation of history!

The Present Danger » ii

of carrying on the government with one House, that shortly
before his death he revived, after a fashion, the Upper House,
limiting, however, its members to a few of his own adherents.
Meanwhile the country had become thoroughly disgusted with
the condition to which it had been brought by the overthrow of
the ancient Constitution, and was weary of the military des-
potism which had followed the abolition of the monarchy and
the suppression of the House of Lords. As those two dis-
astrous measures had been adopted at the same time, so the
reversal of them was destined to take place simultaneously.

In April, 1660, upon the meeting of a new Parliament under
the auspices of General Monk, the Peers reassembled of their
own accord in the House of Lords, and no opposition was
made to their doing so, although the ordinance dissolving that
House remained in form unrepealed. As is well known, the
restoration of the monarchy followed within a few weeks, and
legislation by King, Lords, and Commons, which had been
suspended for ten years, was permanently resumed, to the
intense relief and satisfaction of all classes of the community.

The -b'cs nt But, it may be said, it is unreasonable to con-
danger, elude that because the overthrow of the House
of Lords was followed by the degradation of the
House of Commons in the seventeenth century it would neces-
sarily be attended with a similar result in the present day.
Possibly it might be unreasonable, if there were not actually
ominous signs to be discerned, which unmistakably support
that conclusion. It would be an insult to the memory of Oliver
Cromwell to draw a parallel between him and our present Prime
Minister. Great as were his faults, Cromwell was an un-
doubted statesman, under whose firm and straightforward
policy the name of England was respected, her flag honoured,
and her counsels received with deference throughout the
civilised world. But Mr. Gladstone resembles the Protector
in his impatience of any assembly which does not implicitly
follow his behests. We have seen how Cromwell, after over-
throwing the Upper House, proceeded to attack and overawe
the House of Commons. We shall hereafter have occasion
to notice three distinct blows which Mr. Gladstone during the
last fifteen years has levelled at the authority of the House of
Lords ; and he, at the same time, makes no secret of his
desire to alter the procedure and curtail the liberties of the
House of Commons. Already, two years ago, we have had the
Parliamentary session adjourned to the autumn for that special

12 The Questions to he Solved,

i)urpose ; but Mr. Gladstone is careful, whenever the oppor-
tunity offers, to express, in replies to deputations and corre-
spondents, his conviction that the labours then bestowed on
the matter were a failure, and that the mode of conducting
business in the Lower House requires to be reformed in a yet
more trenchant manner.

There is an old proverb which directs us where to assign the
blame when a workman complains of his tools. It would seem
to apply with even greater force, if the workman continues to
complain after he has attempted to mend and sharpen them.
Moreover, when the workman laments that he cannot get
through his job, and yet never resorts to the sharp edge which
he himself forged for the purpose, the suspicion cannot help
being awakened that he is purposely abstaining from using it
with a view to persuade a credulous nation that he requires a
yet keener weapon, with which they would be unwilling to
entrust him unless they were persuaded that it was absolutely
essential. Whether or not this was Mr. Gladstone's design in
refraining from putting in force the cl6t^cre during the weari-
some hours which were wasted on Supply by Irish Members
towards the end of July and beginning of August in the pre-
sent year may be a matter of conjecture. But the fact
remains that, notwithstanding his own amendments of it in
1882, he has denounced the present procedure of the House of
Commons no less clearly than his followers have condemned
the existing powers of the House of Lords.

^, . Of course, if the continuance of these powers

to be solved. ^ ^ ^^ isitsd to the best interests of the country, we
must not be deterred from endeavouring to
abolish or restrict them by the risk that we may at the same
time damage the political fabric of the Lower House. But
the existence of this risk is an additional reason why, before
joining in the campaign against the Peers, we should pause
and ask ourselves seriously and anxiously whether by doing so
we should be taking a course calculated to further the welfare
of the nation. The questions to be solved are two in number: —
(i.) Is the maintenance of a second Legislative Chamber of
any kind desirable ? And (ii.) if it is, is it expedient that
the present House of Lords should be continued as the Second
Chamber, or should some assembly differently constituted be
substituted for it ? It is proposed in the following pages to
discuss these questions in the order in which they have been
mentioned, with a view to arriving at a sound conclusion on
the whole matter.

Testimony of Antiquity — Testimony of Modern Times, 13

I.— IS A SECOND LEGISLATIVE CHAMBER OF
ANY KIND DESIRABLE?

-, .. . There has never been any very serious differ-

antiquity. ^^^e of opinion as to the answer which should

be given to this question. It is true that some
closet philosophers have affirmed that the existence of a
Second Chamber is unnecessary for, and even injurious to,
Constitutional Government. But the common sense of man-
kind has preferred to be guided by experience in the matter,
and has decided with tolerable unanimity in the opposite direc-
tion. In the Republics and Constitutional States of ancient
Greece, among the lonians, Cohans, and Dorians alike, at
Athens, at Thebes, and at Sparta, we find during their best
epochs the government divided between the Boule or
Gerousia, which corresponded with the Roman Senate,
and the Agora, or popular assembly. In those cases in
which the Boule was in course of time overthrown by
revolution, the free institutions of the State did not long
survive its fall. In the palmiest days of the old Roman
Republic political power was divided between the Senate and
the Comitia, or assemblies of the people ; and. it was the
weakening of the power of the Senate which opened the way
for the overthrow of the Republic by the Caesars, and
for the despotism of the later Emperors. In the
early barbaric stage of the Prankish and German
tribes, who have ultimately developed into the modern
nations of Western Europe, we do not expect to find any
very matured political institutions. Before they subdued the
Roman Empire, and were themselves subdued by its civilising
influences, their government was of a simple and informal
character. Yet we learn from the historian Tacitus that
even then not only the king or the chief of the tribe, but
also a council, composed of a select body of his followers,
shared with the general assembly of the tribe the control over
public affairs.

^ ,. J, The general adhesion which in modern times

A CSttfltOttV Of c

modern times, ^as ultimately been given to the principle of
a two-chambered legislature cannot be better
described than in the words of Professor Lieber. Imprisoned
in his youth, and expelled from the schools in Prussia on
account of his democratic opinions, he cannot be accused of
any aristocratic tendencies : —

Jj4 Recent Constitutions. ' " ' ^

*VAlthough," he says, "practice alone can show the whole advantage
that may be derived from the system of two Houses, it must be a striking
fact to every inquirer in distant countries, that not only has the system
of two Houses historically developed itself in England, but it has been
adopted by the United States in all the thirty-one States-, as well as the
six now existing territories, and by all the British Colonies where local Legis-
latures exist. We may mention even the African State of Liberia. The
bi-cameral system accompanies the Anglican race like the common law,
while no one attempt at introducing the uni-cameral system in larger
countries has succeeded. France, Spain, Naples, Portugal — in all these
countries it has been tried, and everywhere it has failed.''' The idea of
one House flows from that of the unity of power, so popular in France.
The bi-cameral system is called by the advocates of democratic unity of
power an aristocratic institution. This is an utter mistake. In reality,
it is a truly popular principle to insist on the protection of a Legislature
divided into two Houses."

r? f r Since the Professor penned these lines in his
tutions. great work on " Civil Liberty and Self-Govern-

ment," the bi-cameral system, as he calls it, has
been further adopted in the Austrian Reichsrath, the Hungarian
Diet, the Italian Parliament and the Imperial German Parlia-
ment, and in the Federal Assembly of the Dominion of Canada.
The French also have wisely taken warning from the rapid fate
of their First and Second Republics, to which the system of
having only one Chamber no doubt largely contributed, and
have in their present Third Republic constituted two Houses, a
Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. It requires no small stock of
credulity to believe that all the nations, beginning with the
United States of America, which have thus copied the compo-
sition of our own Parliament, have been in error in doing so.
And he must be a man of no little arrogance and self-conceit
who presumes to set up his own opinion in favour of a single-
chambered Legislature against the verdict of history and
against the conclusions of Lieber, Kent, and Story, and other
great American writers, and the weighty European authorities
who maintain that Representative Government cannot perma-
nently be carried on without a Second Chamber, that the
bi-cameral system is an essential guarantee for the main-
tenance of order and liberty, and that a single legislative
assembly invariably brings misery upon a State by its insta-
bility, its violence, and its impassioned temerity. It really
does not appear necessary to spend further time in proving that

-'' The Professor might have added the instance of our own country, in
which, as we have seen, Cromwell himself found it ultimately necessary
to revive a Second Chamber after trying in vain to govern without one.

The Composition of the House of Lords, 15

the answer to our first question ought to be in the affirmative,
and that a Second Legislative Chamber of some kind is not
only desirable but essential.

Our second question is open to more difference of opinion,
and requires to be considered at greater length.

IL— IS IT EXPEDIENT THAT THE PRESENT
HOUSE OF LORDS SHOULD BE CONTINUED
AS THE SECOND CHAMBER OF THE PARLIA-
MENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM?

In order to arrive at a right decision upon this question, it
behoves us to inquire into {a) the Constitution of the House,
and the advantages or disadvantages w^hich are consequent
upon it ; and (6) the benefit or otherwise which the House, as
actually constituted, has conferred on the country during the
course of our history.

(a) The Constitution of the House,

In considering the constitution of the House
sition of the ^^ Lords, it is important to bear in mind that
House of Lords, ^his constitution does not owe its origin to any

cut-and-dried scheme or any carefuUy concocted
design. It is the product of events, and only reached its pre-
sent condition after the lapse of centuries. It possesses, in
fact, that feature of natural growth, as opposed to artificial
construction, which has distinguished all our institutions from
those of foreign countries, and goes far to account for their
superior permanency and stability. The existence in the early
German tribes of select councils, as well as general tribal
assemblies, has been already pointed out. When the tribes of
Angles and Saxons who settled in England first formed them-
selves into kingdoms, their councils developed into witenage-
mots (assemblies of the witan, or wise men). Upon the
consolidation of the Heptarchy into one kingdom, under
the sovereign of Wessex, the Witenagemot of Wessex be-
came enlarged into the Witenagemot of all England, and
v/as composed of the lay nobles and the bishops, abbots,
and priors of the realm. The Witenagemot survived the
Norman Conquest, but it was thenceforth called the Great
Council. The right to attend it was at first possessed by the
lay and spiritual heads of the counties — the counts or earls,
and the archbishops and bishops — and by such other laymen and

1 6 The Composition of the House of Lords.

such abbots and priors as held baronies from the Crown, and
also by those tenants of the Crown who held land of less
extent than a barony, but were bound to render military service
in respect of it. Henry II. commenced the practice of sending
special writs of summons to the individuals who were to
attend the Council ; and he and his successors did not confine
the writs to those who, as above mentioned, had the privilege
of attending, but introduced into the assembly lawyers and
clerks whom it was desired to raise to judicial or administrative
offices. Gradually, the receipt of a summons, and not the pos-
session of a barony, came to be considered as conferring the
right to be present, and the omission of a summons was held
to debar a baron from attending. By Magna Charta, however,
the King bound himself to summon all the archbishops,
bishops, abbots, earls, and barons, and also the lesser tenants of
the Crov/n. After the constitution, in the latter half of the thir-
teenth century, of a Lower House to represent the interests of
the Commons, some of the lesser tenants of the Crown were
elevated to baronies, and the rest were no longer sum-
moned. In this way the Upper House became ultimately
confined to the lay and spiritual Peers. The number of the
former was not at this time large. In the last Parliament
before the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses, fifty-three are
recorded as having been in attendance. Their rank^ were
considerably thinned by those wars, and Henry VII. sum-
moned only twenty-nine to his first Parliament. The spiritual
Peers constituted at this time the majority of the House ; but
by the dissolution of the monasteries about thirty-six abbots
and priors were withdrawn, and the bishops who remained
formed about one-third of the, whole peerage. All this time,
while the spiritual peerages had descended to the successive
occupiers of the sees, or monastic dignities, in respect of which
they had been originally conferred, the lay seats in the House
of Lords had been occupied in successive generations by the
owners of the baronies or estates to which they had been
attached, and thus had, for the most part, descended from
father to son.

About the end of Elizabeth's reign the general practice
became recognised as a rule, and the receipt of a writ of
summons to the Upper House was held to confer a hereditary
peerage, independently of the question whether the son retained
his ancestral estate. Moreover, in 1626, it was laid down as a
fundamental principle, that every Peer of full age is entitled to

Two Salient Features. 17

his writ of summons at the beginning of a Parliament, and that
the House will not proceed with business if any Peer is denied
it. Since that time the alterations in the constitution of the
House of Lords have been five in number, (i.) By the Act of
Union with Scotland in 1706 there were added to it sixteen
representative Peers for that country, to be chosen at the
commencement of each Parliament by the Scottish Peers,
(ii.) The Act of Union with Ireland in 1801 made a further
addition of twenty-eight representatives of the Irish peerage.
These, however, are chosen for life, (iii.) Since the beginning
of George III.'s reign, the number of lay Peers has been more
than doubled, so that it now exceeds five hundred, (iv.) Not-
withstanding the increase in the number of bishoprics during the
present reign the number of spiritual Peers has been reduced.
The Irish bishops have ceased to be members of the House,
and the number of the English episcopal seats has been kept
stationary, the prelates (except the two Archbishops and the
the Bishops of London, Durham, and Winchester, who sit at
once) succeeding to them, as vacancies occur, in order of
seniority, (v.) In 1876, provision was made for increasing the
judicial strength of the Upper House by the appointment from
time to time of four law lords of appeal in ordinary, who enjoy
the title of Baron for life, without transmitting it to their
heirs, and are entitled to a seat in the Upper House as long as
they continue to exercise their judicial functions.

These changes, however, have not substantially altered the
composition of our Second Chamber; and it may be truly
affirmed that, just as our present Sovereign can trace back her
lineal descent to Cerdic, who founded the kingdom of Wessex
in 519, so the House of Lords, as it now exists, is the modern
development, through an unbroken succession, of the Wite-
nagemot of Wessex of the sixth century, which, as already
mentioned, became, upon the consolidation of the Heptarchy,
the Witenagemot of England. It is thus something like
1,300 years old, or more than double the age of the House of
Commons.

«, ,. . Shall we then retain this ancient institution or

features. substitute some other for it ? To decide this
we must consider what are its characteristic
features, and what it would be possible to have in their place.
The two salient and counter-balancing principles in the present
constitution of the House of Lords are, on the one hand, the
hereditary descent of its seats, and, on the other hand, the

i8 Alternatives Possible-^Objections to Election.

unlimited power of the Crown, or, in other words, of the
Minister of the day, to create new Peers. The first principle
ensures the independence of the House, the second provides
for the continual influx into it of new blood and new ideas,
and gives the opportunity of retaining for the country the
benefit of the counsels of distinguished men who have served
their time in the more exhausting scenes of contested elections
and the House of Commons, or may be for various reasons unable
to enter into those scenes. Either principle without the other
would produce a baleful result, but the two together work
with benefit to the nation, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to devise a scheme which could be substituted
with advantage for their combined operation.

Alt t'v ^^^ ^^ ^^^ present constitution of the House

possible. is ^o be abolished, what are the alternatives
before us ? The tenure of seats for life, or som^
shorter period, either by nomination or election. Fqw personSj
if any, would advocate a Second Chamber entirely composed
of nominees of the Crown, that is, of successive Governments.
It is certain that if this had been the composition of the
House of Lords in old times, when the Power of the Crown
was more or less completely in the hands of the individual
-Sovereign, the British Constitution would not have been what
it is. It was the Peers who originally won the liberties of
England, and it was their territorial and hereditary status
which gave them independence . and enabled them to da
so. Our freedom and rights are no longer in danger from thq
personal encroachments of the monarch, but history contain^.
not a few instances of an individual who has been raised to
power by the suffrages of the people having ended by destroy-
ing their liberties. The whole current of modern practice has
been against the principle of nomination, and to entrust the
composition of the Second Chamber to a succession of PrimQ
Ministers, enjoying for the tirne the confidence of a majority
of the nation, is a plan which no sane politician would
seriously propose.

Objection t There remains, then, the method of election.
election. This is the scheme which is being strenuously
advocated by Radical speakers and writers at
the present time. There is no accord, however, between them
as to the details of the scheme, and no wonder. For it is
impossible to frame details which would be otherwise than
unsatisfactory. Shall the members of the Upper House be

. " Foreign Practice no Precedent, jg

elected by the Peers? This, if the political power of the
Peerage is an evil, would only be to focus and intensify the
evil. It would add to rather than detract from the strength
of the Lords, while it would destroy that breadth and compre-
hensiveness in the House which, as will be pointed out later
on, is one of the best of its present features. Shall they then
be elected by the same constituencies as elect the members of
the Lower House ? If they are, what claim can one House
more than the other make to be the chief representative
assembly ? The origin of the two being identical, their functions
will become confounded, their relations to each other will be
unreal and productive of constant misunderstandings. The
remaining alternative that they should be elected by a select
class among the commoners is one which need only be men-
tioned to be at once condemned.

p I u It may, however, be urged that an elected

ticeZJrlcedeZ', Senate has worked admirably in America.
Granted that this is so ; but the American con-
stitution, by its peculiarities, admits of a mode of electing a
Senate which would be impracticable in our own country.
The Senate of the United States is not elected by the
citizens at large, but by the State legislatures, two senators
being returned by every State. It is obvious' that the
working of a Senate so elected furnishes no criterion as
to the probable working of an elected Upper House
among ourselves, when the mode of election, whatever it
might be, would certainly be completely different from that
which exists in America. The more influential nations of
Europe have not adopted an elective Upper Chamber. In
the German States, including Austria, some of the mem-
bers are hereditary, and the rest are nominated for life,
or become life members by tenure of office. In Italy, all
the members, except the Royal Princes, are nominated for life.
Even in Republican France the Senate does not consist
entirely of elected members. Of the 300 members, 75 hold
their seats for life, and vacancies in these seats are filled up by
the Senate itself. The remaining 225 are chosen at intervals
by the Senatorial electors, some of whom are elected by the
communes and municipalities, and the rest are local officials.*
The case of Belgium, where the members of the two Houses
are elected by the same constituencies, is, as will be noticed
later on, one to be held up as a warning, and not as a pattern.
"^Alterations as to the Senate are, however, under consideration.

20 Greater power of an elected Second Chamber.

Besides the considerations which have been
ofTn''!lZ7d already adduced, there is one further point about
Second Chamber. ^^ elected Second Chamber which must not be
left unnoticed. Those who at present advocate
it do so with a view to put a stop to that undue interference
with the measures proposed by the Commons, of which they
allege the House of Lords to be guilty. But a little reflection
will convince us that the proposed alteration in the
constitution of the Upper Chamber would have an exactly
opposite effect. At present, however much any of the Peers
may in fact represent the opinions and sentiments of their
fellow-countrymen, they can make no claim that they do so,
and though responsible to public opinion in general, they are
not so to any constituencies in particular. Recognising,
therefore, that the will of the commons of England must
ultimately decide all public questions, they invariably defer
sooner or later to that will when expressed through the
representatives of the commons in the Lower House.
Content, moreover, with their assumed position as Peers of
the Realm, the majority of them do not seek for political
distinction within the walls of the House of Lords, but
allow the course of legislation to flow smoothly and rapidly
through their Chamber without that delay which would in-
evitably take place, if a larger number of the members, however
benevolent their intentions, were to take part in it. But
make the members of the Upper House elective, and all this
would be changed. They would represent, and would feel
themselves responsible to, distinct constituencies ; and in duty
to those constituencies they would feel bound to assert
themselves, in the first place by continually taking an active
and prominent part in all the legislation of the country, and,
in the second place, by occasionally performing that function
which they had been speciall}^ elected to discharge, namely,
thwarting the proposals of the Lower House.

Now, even supposing this second course to be rarely or
never adopted, has the consequence of the first course ever
occurred to the Radical mind ? We are all aware of the
laments over the difficulty of getting through business in the
House of Commons at the present day ; but are we aware of
one of the chief causes of that difficulty? Informer days,
when five-sixths of the members were silent, and their con-
stituencies were content that they should be so, no such
difficulty existed. But now that the constituencies, one and

Advantages of an Hereditary House, 2i

all, expect their members to take an active part in the
proceedings of the House, by asking questions, if in no other
manner, and the members do not disappoint their constituen-
cies, the wheels of public business are inevitably retarded.
Let us imagine the same state of things introduced into the
Upper House, the slow progress of measures through it which
would be the consequence, the small divergencies which would
arise on almost every subject between the two Houses, the
bandying backwards and forwards of Bills, and the conferences
between the two Houses, which would take place for the
purpose of settling the points in dispute, and some idea may
be formed of the degree of benefit which the country would
reap from substituting an elective Second Chamber for the
present House of Lords.

Instead, therefore, of craving after imaginary
an heredf/ary improvements, which a closer inspection reveals
House, to be impracticable of attainment, and, to say

the least, of but questionable benefit if we could
attain to them, let us inquire whether there are not, after
all, advantages in the state of things which we actually have.
If we do, we shall discover benefits in the much-maligned
hereditary constitution of the House of Lords which escape the
superficial survey of the Radical mind. We must first recol-
lect what this hereditary constitution is not, as well as what
it is. It means the descent of the title and legislative seat of
each Peer to his heir, and so on from generation to generation ;
but it does not mean that the Peers form an hereditary caste
by themselves, with class privileges and class prejudices dis-
tinguishing them from their fellow countrymen. So far from
this, the younger children of Peers and their descendants are
commoners, with no political privileges or legal rights above
those of the humblest subject of the realm. Nay, more, the
eldest son himself is only a commoner, like the rest, until his
father's death. The same holds true of all the children of the
Sovereign, except the eldest son and eldest daughter, who
have by law special privileges.

It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the beneficial effect of
this feature of our Constitution in banding all ranks together,
and preventing the growth of an exclusive nobility out of
sympathy with the rest of the nation. Without this feature it
may be at once admitted that an hereditary peerage would
have been a curse to the country, but tempered by this feature
it is, as we shall proceed to show, a blessing. In the first

22 A dvantages of an Hereditary House.

place, th^re can be but one answer to the question, which of the
two is likely to take a more real and deep interest in his
country's welfare — a member of the Upper House, who should
merely possess a seat in it for his life, with no past traditions
encircling himself and his fellow peers, and no prospect of
handing down to his descendants the fame and product of his
labours ; or the peer under the existing system, who is, perhaps,
the descendant of a long line of patriotic statesmen, and, at any
rate, has the prospect of transmitting the results of his
achievements to a succession of ennobled heirs. Considering
the political heritage which they have in their keeping for
their descendants, the saying of Bacon, that men who have
children have given hostages to society, applies with tenfold
force to hereditary Peers ; but to life Peers it would have no
more special application than to the rest of their fellow-
countrymen.

It is true that we unhappily find that the obligations attach-
ing to nobility are not invariably recognised. Black sheep will
from time to time appear among the Peers, as among members
of the House of Commons and other bodies. In Edward IV. 's
reign, George Neville, Duke of Bedford, was, by Act of
Parliament, degraded from the peerage on account of his
poverty, which rendered him unable to support his dignity. It
is worthy of consideration whether this precedent should not
be revived in cases not of poverty but of grave misconduct, and
made generally applicable, so that an unworthy Peer should
lose the dignity not only for himself but also for his heirs.
This, like the many forfeitures of peerages on attainder for
high treason, which have taken place in former times, would
be no real interference with the hereditary principle ; but,
whether we adopt it or no, that principle should be judged not
by its occasional abuse but by its general advantages.

We pass on, therefore, to consider a second advantage which
we derive from it, namely, the existence of a certain number of
statesmen trained to political life from their youth. There
have been recently scoffs at the idea that we could hope to
obtain a body of hereditary statesmen any more than a body
of hereditary mathematicians; but, if the question is looked
into a little more narrowly, the scoffs will be found to be out of
place. If politics could be exactly compared to mathematics,
it is the members of the House of Commons, and not the
Peers, who would be condemned by the comparison. For who
has ever become a great mathematician without careful train-

A dvantages of an Hereditary House, ^3

ing in figures in his youth, if not in his boyhood ? Yet we
admit among the ranks of our statesmen men like Mr.
Chamberlain, who have spent their early manhood in enriching
themselves — shall we say at the expense of their fellow-
countrymen ? — well, at any rate, with the help of their toil,
and have only taken to politics at the age of thirty, or perhaps
later. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to decide whether a
man is a truly sound and wise politician as whether he is an
accurate mathematician ; but those who have raised this scoff
against the Peers are reduced to the following dilemma : If
their comparison between the two pursuits is just, then, since
a man cannot become a mathematician without severe study in
the early part of his life, we must conclude that he cannot
become a true statesman without the same training, and we
must reject, as unfit to govern us, all persons like Mr.
Chamberlain, who cannot show that they have undergonethis
training. But if the comparison cannot be pressed to this
lengthj then it is clear that politics and mathematics do not
stand on the same footing, and the argument that an hereditary
body of politicians is as impossible as an hereditary body of
mathematicians falls to the ground. The truly reasonable
view of the matter is that, although the hereditary principle
does not ensure that the heir to a peerage shall be a states-
man, yet it gives him special facilities for becoming so.

So far, after all, the parallel between politics and any other
branch of knowledge will hold good. The son of a mathe-
matician has special opportunities for becoming himself a
mathematician. Sir John Herschel would probably never
have been what he was if he had not been the son of Sir
William Herschel. Darwin largely owed his attainments as
a natural philosopher to his early training under his scientific
father ; and similar instances might be multiplied without
number. But the heir to a peerage has not only peculiar
facilities for becoming a politician, he has also special induce-
ments to do so. For he knows that he has a field for the
exercise of his political attainments secured to him for life, not
dependent upon the caprice of a body of constituents. He
can, therefore, devote himself to the study of politics without
being all the time discouraged by the uncertainty whether he
will ever be able to turn his labours to account. It is well
to recollect that we owe to this circumstance many useful
members of the House of Commons, no less than of the House
of Lords ; the instances being not a few in which the future

24 Limitation of Number Inexpedient,

Peer begins his political career in the Lower House during his
father's lifetime.

It is no answer to say that these results are not found to
occur universally. There would be no real advantage in their
doing so. For it has been shown above that if every born Peer
were a born legislator, the result, instead of being beneficial,
would be disastrous to the nation. We should, then, in.deed,
have too many cooks spoiling the broth of the country's affairs.
There are plenty of functions for public men to discharge out-
side the walls of Parliament ; and we may be content if the
hereditary principle gives us a certain number of statesmen,
of whose services the country would not otherwise have had
the benefit.

But if this is sufficient, the question next
Limttatwn of ^^ises whether it would be desirable to limit the
^dimt7 *"^^^^' number of members of the Upper House, either
by restricting the whole peerage, or by only per-
mitting a fraction of Peers to sit in it. To this question a
little reflection will enable us to answer emphatically. No.
Neither course would conduce to the interests of the nation at
large. In 1719 and 1720 attempts were actually made to
limit the ranks of the nobility. It was proposed that the then
existing number of 178 peerages should not be augmented by
more than six, though the Crown was to retain power to create
new peerages in the place of any which might become extinct,
and, instead of the 76 representative Peers, 25 hereditary
Peers of Scotland were to have permanent seats. This proposal,
however, was wisely rejected. It was foreseen that it involved
the danger of the Peers becoming crystallised into a narrow
oligarchy, and that the country would sustain a positive loss
if deserving individuals could not be raised to the peerage
whenever their own merits or the public welfare rendered it
desirable, without the necessity of waiting till a vacancy should
occur in the ranks of the Lords by the extinction of a peerage.
We may estimate what that loss would have been by calling
to mind the many distinguished men of both parties, and of all
occupations, with which the House of Peers has been enriched
through the absence of any limit on its number.

The other scheme, that, namely, of only allowing a limited
number of representative Peers to sit in the Upper House, has
never been seriously put forward. It is open to grave objec-
tions, one of which has been already alluded to. Peers, sitting
in the House on behalf not only of themselves, but also of

Limitation of N timber Inexpedient, 25

their fellow Peers who had elected them, would of necessity be
far more jealous of maintaining the power of their own order
-and anxious for its interests, and far less able to take up an
independent position in politics, than they are at present, when
they can all form and express their own opinions, and adopt
their own line of action, without being responsible to other
members of their body. They would speak and act in many
cases not in accordance with their own convictions, but in
accordance with the wishes of the less statesmanlike portion
of the peerage whom they had been sent to represent in the
House. That this evil has not shown itself in the case of the
representative Peers of Scotland and Ireland is due to the
fact that representation is confined to their case, and is not the
principle which pervades the whole House. But, it may be
said, this is an evil which is inseparable from any system of
representation, and it already exists in the Lower House.
True ; and the country doubtless suffers from the extent to
which members of the House of Commons often speak and
vote in accordance with the mandate which they have received
from their constituencies, instead of in accordance with their
own convictions and with the weight of the arguments which
are brought forward in debate. We shall not soen forget the
confession on this point made by Mr. Laing in the Vote of
Censure Debate on May 12, 1884, when he said that he, at
least, must decline to vote any longer that black was white at
the bidding of the Government whips. The evil must be
endured in the Lower House, because it is a physical impos-
sibility that the voice of the people can be heard in that House
otherwise than by representation ; but why introduce it into
the Upper House when no necessity exists for the importation
into it of the representative system ? The fact is, that its
absence is one of the best features of our House of Lords as
at present constituted.

In discussing democratic forms of government, all political
writers distinguish between a pure democracy, where each
citizen has a direct voice and vote in administration and
legislation, and a representative democracy, where these
functions are committed to a limited body, selected for the
purpose from time to time by their fellow citizens ; and all
agree in assigning the palm to the former, where its existence
is practicable. Of course, among ourselves it is out of the
question. We cannot form either the 5,000,000 electors whom
we are to have, nor even the present 3,000,000, into a legis-

c

26 Magna Charta.

lative assembly ; and, therefore, we are obliged to have recourse
to the inferior method, and constitute our House of Commons
by representation. But small States, such as ancient Athens,
and Rome, in her early and palmy days, would never have
dreamt of recourse to representation, while all their citizens
could personally attend the assembly. And, similarly, while the
number of our Peers is less than that of the House of
Commons, it would be the height of unwisdom to substitute a
system of representation for their individual political responsi-
bility. It would not only unnecessarily deprive the nation of
the counsels of individuals, whose occasional presence in the
deliberations of Parliament is of the greatest service, but it
would deal a heavy blow on the present broad and democratic
character of our Upper House.

(b) The Verdict of History on the House of Lords.

yr ch t ^^ remains for us to submit the working of our
present Upper House to the test of history.
Have the Peers, on the whole, done good service to the
country or the reverse ? All Englishmen are agreed that
the keystone of the liberties of the people is to be found
in Magna Charta, and that no other measure can com-
pare with it in importance. But when we dwell on
the benefits which we derive from Magna Charta, how
often do we call to mind that we owe those benefits to
the Peers of England ? It was the Lords who extorted
Magna Charta from King John in the meadows of Runny-
mede. It was the Lords who insisted on a solemn ratifi-
cation of it by the two succeeding sovereigns, Henry III.
and Edward I. Not only so, but they obtained at the same
time the Charter of the Forests, which gave relief from the
oppressive forest laws, to which the people had been previously
subject, and was in those days considered only second in import-
ance to Magna Charta itself. Further it was the Peers who
brought about the representation of the counties and boroughs
in Parliament ; and thus it is to the Lords that the House of
Commons owes its very existence. For a long time after this
latter House came into being, the records of Parliament do
not clearly show the distinct parts in legislation which were
taken by the two Houses ; but the important services on the
field of battle, on the sea, and in the council chamber, which
have been in all ages rendered to the country by individual
Peers, are notorious to every reader of our history. With these,

Charges against the, Modern Conduct of the House, 27

however, we are not here concerned. Our inquhy must be
confined to the House of Lords as a legislative and deliberative
assembly, and as a branch of Parliament.*

Before, however, we pass in review the con-
^^■^ ^t^t^i ^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ House in modern times, we must
l^odeln' conduct ^^^^ a clear idea of what have come to be the
of the House. recognised functions of the House in matters of
legislation and administration ; for it is evident
that upon the accuracy of the idea which we form with respect
to these will depend the correctness of the verdict which we
pass upon the conduct of the House. Much of the censure
which is at present being levelled at the Peers from the
Radical camp consists in blaming them for doing that which it
was their recognised function to do, and for omitting to take a
part which was clearly outside their duty. Much of this
censure, too, is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Thus, to
take a glaring instance, one Radical authority proposes that
the Lower House should have a veto upon their proceedings,
so that if, after they had rejected a measure in one session, it
was again sent up to them by the Commons in the following
session, they should have no power of rejecting it a second
time. But another Radical writer derides them for adopting
the very course respecting the Ballot Bill whicli they would
have been obliged to take if this veto and limitation of their
powers had been the law of the land. For in 1871 they rejected
the Bill ; but in 1872, on its being again sent up to them by
the House of Commons, they consented to pass it. Again,
one opponent censures them for retarding the progress of
Radical legislation, and introducing Conservative amend-
ments into Radical measures, for discharging, in fact, the
primary duties of a Second Chamber. Another attempt
to excite odium against them is by dilating on the small
proportion of beneficial legislation which has initiated with
them, and the scanty deliberation which they bestow on the
measures sent up to them, regardless of the fact that it is not their
function to initiate legislation on what are all called the burning
questions of the day. Yet the real reason why more Bills are
not actually started in the Upper House, and why the Peers so

■'- The subjects treated of in the following pages have been admirably
and exhaustively handled by Lord Salisbury in recent speeches. All
supporters of our Constitution are deeply indebted to his Lordship for the
fund of arguments founded on history, experience, and reason with which
he has supplied them.

28 Modern Functions of the House,

often hurry through the Bills which come up to them from the
Commons, is that the Government have persistently refrained
from initiating in the House of Lords measures which might
well have been discussed there in the first instance, and are
in the habit of sending up from the Commons such a crop of
Bills at the close of the Session that the Peers are unable to
bestow upon each the time and attention which it requires.
It should be observed, however, that the charges of unduly
altering the Commons' measures, and of not vouchsafing to
them sufficient consideration, are mutually destructive of each
other. Lastly, if, out of deference to the House of Commons,
the Peers consent to pass a measure of which they do not
thoroughly approve, they are sneered at by the Prime
Minister as wanting in courage and chivalry,* while if they do
maintain their opinions against those of the Lower House,
when they have all right and reason indisputably on their side,
an outcry is raised that their powers must be curtailed, or even
their House itself abolished.

Let us now turn away our attention from this
Modern Func- \^q]^q\ gf discordant clamourings, and enquire
House. ^ what are the true functions of the House of

Lords under our Constitution as it has been
developed in modern times. The inquiry is rendered
difficult by the fact that we have no written Consti-
tution to consult, such as exists in the United States and
now in France, as well as in other civilised nations in
which a constitutional form of Government has been an
acquisition of recent date. The glory of our Constitution is
that, though never committed to paper, it has been main-
tained almost inviolate from generation to generation,
developing with the development of the nation, and changing
just as much as the changes in the condition of the nation
require, and no more. In the course of this development and
change the House of Lords, which was originally the chief
legislative assembly of the country, has come at length to

* On August II, 1881, Mr. Gladstone, speaking in the House of
Commons on the subject of the Irish Land Bill, said : — "The courage of
the Party opposite was such that they divided valiantly against the second
reading in the House where they knew their division could not have the
smallest effect; and in the House where they knew that if they divided
against the second reading the bill would have been thrown out, there
their courage failed them. The chivalry of the minority of this House
was not reflected in the action of the majority of the other." — " Hansards.
Parliamentary Debates," vol. 264, col. 1570.

Modern Functions of the House, 2g

occupy the position which is assigned by all the best political
writers and thinkers to a Second Chamber, namely, that of
being a check upon the Lower House. Of course this is not
the whole of its functions. It is true that it has not the
special prerogatives and peculiar authority which is
possessed by the Senate in America, as, for instance, the
right of vetoing all appointments to offices made by the
President. But we ought never to forget the useful part
which the House of Lords takes in private Bill legislation,
nor the services which its members who are in the Ministry
render to the country in the different departments of the
Government, and in the management of the concerns of
the nation at home and abroad. Nor should we lose sight
of the value of its debates on colonial and foreign affairs in
elucidating the facts of the situation, and ascertaining the
policy which ought to be adopted. But on important questions
it has now for a long time been recognised that the will of the
country at large must ultimately prevail ; and when that will
is clearly and unmistakeably expressed, the House of Lords
ought to defer to it, and does, in fact, always sooner or later
do so. But this, be it observed, is a very different thing from
saying that the Lords ought always and in all m'atters to defer
to the will of the House of Commons. That House, imme-
diately after a general election, and especially as to subjects
which were under discussion during the election, must be re-
garded as an undoubted exponent of the sentiments of the
nation. But it by no means necessarily remains so after three
or four years have gone by, when public opinion has changed,
when the constituencies have been altered by the death of old
electors and the registration of new voters in their place, and
when subjects are brought forward which were not even
alluded to at the general election. Our Radical friends would
be the first to deny that the sentiments of the country were
represented by the House of Commons during the fifteen
months which preceded the entire reversal by the General Elec-
tion of 1880 of the proportion of the two parties within its walls.
Suppose, therefore, that in the course of 1879 the Lords
had adopted the Radical view on some Conservative measure,
which had been sent up to them from the Lower House, would
they have acted rightly or wrongly, constitutionally or uncon-
stitutionally ?

Nor, again, does it follow that because the country has
expressed generally its desire for a particular measure, it

30 Modern Functions of the House,

would therefore necessarily approve of every clause which the
Bill embodying that measure contains when it leaves the
Lower House. The Peers may, therefore, reasonably claim
liberty to make amendments in the Bill, without being accused
of thwarting the will of the people. How far they should carry
this liberty, what measures they are bound to consider as
indisputably approved by the country at large, and what, on
the other hand, they may consider as coming to them under
circumstances which render the question of that approval
doubtful, it is, of course, in many cases not easy to decide.
Infallibility is not to be found in any body of men, any more
than in any individual man ; but it may be safely said that, if
an error is to be made, it is far better for the Upper House to
err on the side of caution in the matter, and to reject for a
time a measure of which the country does in reality approve,
than hastily to pass a Bill which, though carried in the House
of Commons of the day, does not represent the true sentiments
of the nation. For the evil occasioned by the latter course
would be difficult, if not impossible, to remedy ; whereas a
mistake of the former kind merely involves a brief delay, since,
if the country really shows that it is bent upon the measure
passing, the Lords will withdraw their opposition to it. It is
better in every way that the chariot of national progress should
move slowly and surely rather than hastily and inconsiderately.
No one wishes it to stand still ; but if it is violently pushed
forward with sudden and irregular plunges, it will unquestion-
ably be sometimes pulled back with no less spasmodic jerks.
Hitherto we have happily experienced no reactions of this
kind. When a Conservative House of Commons succeeds a
Radical one, there is no idea of reversing the measures which
were passed in the previous Parliament. Why ? Because
those measures are stamped with the sanction of both parties,
owing to the Conservative House of Lords having given to
them an assent which was, at any rate in theory, voluntary.
And here we see the evil which would arise from any such rule
as that the Lords should not have power to reject a second
time a Bill sent up to them from the Lower House. A Radical
measure passed over their heads by the operation of such a
rule as this would have been passed by one party in the State
alone. When, therefore, the Conservatives came into power
they would have a clear right to repeal the measure, and it
would be surprising if they did not exercise the right. The
same evil would arise if we had no Second Chamber, or if the

Conduct of the Peers in Modern Times. 31

revolution, which is suggested by some so-called reformers, were
to be effected, and our Second Chamber were to be elected by
the same constituencies as the House of Commons. In either
case the measures which were- passed in a Radical direction
would be the measures of one party alone ; and when the time
came for the swing of the political pendulum, and for the return
of the Conservative party to power, their first proceeding
would be to reverse all the acts of the previous Parliament.
That this is no imaginary danger is evident from what we see
actually take place in Belgium. In that country the Second
Chamber is unfortunately elected by the same constituencies
as the First Chamber. The consequence is that there being
complete accord between the two Chambers, the party in
power can carry their measures through the Legislature without
check or restraint ; and when there comes a change of public
opinion, and a dissolution occurs, the new Chambers imme-
diately begin with repealing the results of the labours of their
predecessors.

We are now in a position to consult history,

D ^^"^"^ ^J '^ and ascertain whether the Peers have properly
Peers in modern ,., .,.,. ,, p. 1.1.

times. discharged their duties, and benefited the country

on critical occasions in modern times. We have
already seen how, in the seventeenth century, the downfall of
the House was the precursor of the military tyranny which
dominated over the country during the so-called Common-
wealth, and contributed not a little to render that tyranny
possible. We have seen how the revival of the House coin-
cided with the restoration of constitutional government in
1660. To both Houses alike belongs the credit of steering the
vessel of the State safely through the Revolution of 1688 ; but
it was the body of the Peers who effected the peaceable succes-
sion of George I. on the death of Queen Anne, in 1714. Had
it not been for their action, a return of the Stuart dynasty
might not improbably have taken place. At any rate, the
country could hardly have escaped a civil war, far exceeding in
magnitude the comparatively insignificant outbreak of the
following year. The next crisis in our history in which the
House of Lords played an important part was nearly seventy
years later. In 1783, Mr. Fox carried through a servile House
of Commons by a large majority his outrageous India Bill,
which, if passed into law, would have placed the whole official
patronage of India, both civil and military, in the hands of the
Cabinet of the day. The Lords rejected the measure, and, on

32 The Reform Bill of 1832 — Subsequent History,

the downfall of the coalition administration which ensued,
supported the younger Pitt, who had undertaken to form a new
Ministry, against the majority of the House of Commons, who
did their best to overthrow him. The story of how Mr. Pitt
held his ground, how the majority against him in the Lower
House gradually diminished on every division, how at length
after a conflict of three months, he appealed to the country, and
how the new electors gave him a triumphant majority in the
House of Commons forms one of the most interesting episodes
in our constitutional history. Its value in our present inquiry
consists in the fact that it furnishes an important instance in
which the Lords resolutely adopted the right course in
defiance of the Commons, and in which their conduct received
the warm support and approbation of the country.

The Reform Bill ^ ^^^^ J,^ P"^^ ^o the proceedings as to the
0/1832. Keiorm Bill m 1831-2, we, no doubt, find that

the Peers, as a body, made a mistake ; but
even in this case they ultimately yielded. If, however, we look
a little closer into the causes which led to this resistance, we
shall see that they were such as could not possibly occur
again, and that they were in fact connected not with the
character and composition of the House of Lords, but with
that of the House of Commons. And it is well to remember
that even on the Reform Bill of 1831-2 the Peers did not all of
them adopt a hostile attitude ; and that Lord Grey in partic-
ular mainly contributed to its ultimate success. It is well
also to remember that, as was always insisted on by Lord
Beaconsfield, this Reform Bill was by no means a perfect
measure ; that it actually disfranchised considerable numbers
of the working classes, and placed political power in the
boroughs in the hands of a portion of the middle classes, ar-
bitrarily determining whether they should or should not possess
the franchise by the accident of whether their houses were
above or under the annual value of ^f 10.

Subsequent ^"^ ^^^ actual state of the case was, in truth,

history, very quickly perceived by the country. The

Lords did not long suffer in popular esteem
from the pardonable mistake which they had committed. Nor
did success attend the renewed outcry which, in the course of
the next few years, was attempted to be raised against them
because they did not endorse every word of every Bill which
was sent up to them for approval by the reformed House of
Commons in the crude and inexperienced exercise of its new

The Ballot Bill. 33

powers and in the first blush of its legislative zeal. The
General Election of 1841 returned a strong Conservative
majority to the House of Commons. The experience of 1783-4
was, in fact, repeated ; for it was proved that the Upper House
had divined the true temper of the nation with more accuracy
than the Lower. A further repetition of this experience oc-
curred in 1857, which is instructive as showing that the Lords
are no Tory Caucus, as Mr. Bright has called them, but that
they are ready to support a Whig Minister if he appears to
them to be acting in a manner conducive to the welfare of the
country. In that year the policy of Lord Palmerston with
regard to the China war was arraigned in both Houses. He
obtained a victory in the Lords, who refused to pass the
vote of censure upon him, which was moved by the Tory
leader, the late Lord Derby ; but he was defeated in the Com-
mons, and dissolved Parliament. The country, however,
agreed with the Lords in approving of his policy, and returned
a new House of Commons, which retained him in power
until his subsequent defeat on a wholly different question.
Ti B II t ^^^ ^^ must pass on to our own im-

Qlll^ mediate times. We have already alluded to

the rejection of the Ballot Bill by the Upper
House in 1871 and their passing of it in 1872. The majority of
the House had in the interval satisfied themselves that the
opinion of the country preponderated in favour of the measure.
But their opposition, in the first instance, cannot be considered
unjustifiable when we remember the terrible increase of
corruption, which, according to the testimony of more than
one of our election judges, resulted from the introduction of
voting by ballot, and which led to the passing of that very
stringent measure, the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883. Nor
can it be considered illiberal, when we remember that one of
the foremost opponents of the Bill was Lord Shaftesbury, than
whom no living man has done more for the welfare of the
people of England. It is true that the beneficial provisions
of the early Factory Acts were passed by him when he
was a member of the House of Commons. But the fact
remiains, that the working classes received this boon from
the heir to a peerage, who probably owed his presence
in the House of Commons to the fact of his being so, and
who has since become one of the hereditary members of
the Upper House. It should also be remembered that those
provisions were passed in the face of the most strenuous

^4 ' Railway Legislation — Testimony of M. Clemenceau,

opposition from Mr. Bright, who, in reference to them, posed,
not as the friend of the people, but as the selfish master-
manufacturer. And yet Mr. Bright dares to stigmatise the
legislative action of the House of Lords as presenting a picture
of class selfishness and obstinate resistance to what is liberal
and just ! What does he say to the Law reforms which have
been initiated in the House of Lords during recent years ?
What to the Land reforms effected by Lord Cairns' Convey-
ancing and Settled Land Acts, which he introduced into the
House of Lords and passed through Parliament without any
very hearty support from the Radical Ministry ? What does
he say to the following three instances, out of many which
might be cited, of the watchful solicitude displayed by the
Peers for the true interests of the people ?

Railway (i.) In 1864 the House of Lords resolved, on

Legislation, &c. the motion of the late Lord Derby, then leader of
the Conservative Party, that it be an instruction to the Com-
mittee on every Railway Bill providing for the construction of
any new Railway within the Metropolis, to insert in the Bill
provisions for the purpose of securing to the labouring classes
a cheap transit to and from their labour by a morning and
evening train, (ii.) In February, 1879, the Lords appointed
a Select Committee of members of their House to inquire
into the prevalence of habits of intemperance, and into the
manner in which those habits have been affected by recent
legislation and other causes. This Committee made careful
researches into the subject, and the report which they pre-
sented to the House gave a decided impetus to the movement
in favour of temperance, which has happily been making such
progress amongst us during the last few years, (iii.) In July
of the present year, on the motion of Lord Salisbury (who had
previously in other ways shewn the interest which he takes in
the dwellings of the poorer classes), the House of Lords
adopted a standing order that every Bill for the construction of
a railway through the Metropolis should be required to contain
clauses providing not only that compensation should be given
to the members of the working classes who were evicted, but
also that, so far as possible, the amount of house accommoda-
tion which was suitable for persons of that class, should not
be diminished by the works of the railway.

. We will close our remarks on this sub-

M^aTmenceau. J^^^ ^Y Quoting, as against Mr. Bright's

calumny, the testimony of M. Clemenceau, who

Mr, Gladstone and the House of Lords — The Present Crisis. 35

is one of the most democratic of French politicians. On
August 13th, 1884, in the debate on the French Revision
Bill, he said that —

"A few months ago he had paid a visit to England, and had been in
communication with the leaders of the working men's party. He asked
them — 'Have you any grievance, have you any cause for complaint
against the Government, against the House of Lords, against the Tory
Party?' The answer he received was unanimous; it was this: — 'We
have no reason to complain ; the laws we want passed are passed, and we
have no fault to find with the House of Lords or with the Tory Party;
they have behaved perfectly fairly to the working man, and the House ot
Lords and the Tories are always anxious to deal fairly with the working
man, improve his lot, and grant him what he is legitimately entitled to
expect."

The proceedings with reference to the Ballot

Mr. Gladstone -g-jj ^ ^.-^^ ^^ ^^ constitutional question.

of Lords. Unfortunately the same thing cannot be said

respecting the three other occasions on which
Mr. Gladstone has come into conflict with the Lords. In
1871, when they rejected his Bill for the abolition of purchase
in the Army, he resorted to the high-hand proceeding of using
the Royal Prerogative to frustrate their opposition. By a
Royal Warrant he imposed upon the country a measure which,
whether or not it has given us a better army, Iras undeniably
cost us something like ^18,000,000. Again, in 1882, when
they had committed what was in his eyes the heinous offence
of appointing a committee of their own to inquire into the
working of the Irish Land Act of the previous year, Mr. Glad-
stone wasted four precious nights of the early part of the
Session in carrying through the House of Commons a resolu-
tion declaring '' That Parliamentary inquiry at the present
time into the working of the Irish Land Act tends to defeat
the operation of that Act, and must be injurious to the interests
of good government in Ireland." The resolution was passed,
but it was, of course, powerless to prevent the committee of
the Lords from prosecuting their labours. What was the
result ? The committee reported, and their report contained
some valuable suggestions, which the Ministry themselves
subsequently adopted.
Tie tresent third conflict between Mr. Gladstone and

crisis. ^^^ Upper House is that into which the whole
nation has been drawn, upon the merits of which
both sides are now endeavouring to obtain its informal opinion,
and upon which it will no doubt be called upon to record a
solemn verdict in the polling booths before many months have

36 The Attitude of the Lords,

elapsed. Let us see what is the position which the Lords have
actually taken up in this conflict, and what is the justification
for that position.

The attit d ^^ ^^^ General Election of 1880 the subject
of the Lords, ^f a further reform of the House of Commons
was hardly mentioned. During the first four
sessions of the present Parliament, no allusion was made to
it in the Queen's Speeches, nor was any Bill on the subject
introduced. It is permissible to doubt whether if the Ministry
had been successful in their general policy, we should have
heard anything of the Franchise Bill in the session of 1884.
But the country was becoming disgusted with their disastrous
failures in South Africa, in India, in Ireland, and in Egypt.
Attention must, at all hazards, be drawn off from these failures
by some novel and engrossing subject of interest. A mandate
went forth from high places ; a Radical Conference was as-
sembled at Leeds in the autumn of 1883 ; and resolutions were
passed that the extension to all the householders of the realm
of the franchise, which was already enjoyed by occupiers of
houses within the limits of parliamentary boroughs, was a
question of urgent importance, and required immediate settle-
ment. Ministers professed to be enlightened by these reso-
lutions, and in the fifth session of a Parliament which
had not been specially elected to deal with the ques-
tion, and which was already in the second half of
the legal period of its existence, they proposed an altera-
tion of the Constitution which, according to the admission
of one of their number, Mr. Childers, would be the greatest
which the country has experienced since the Revolution of
1688. This alteration consisted first, of the extension of the
franchise, which has been mentioned, and which it was
estimated would add 2,000,000 more voters to the existing
electorate of 3,000,000 ; and, secondly, of the redistribution
of seats which such an extension of the franchise would of
necessity require. This necessity, it may be observed, is
admitted on both sides, and has always been admitted on
previous occasions when an enlargement of the electorate has
been under discussion. Contrary, however, to all former
precedents, and to previous expressions of opinion on the part
of many of their own followers, as well as the unanimous
judgment of the Conservative Party, the Ministry determined
to divide their measure into two, and to devote the Session of

1884 to the first portion of it, namely, the extension of the

The Attitude of the Lords, yj

franchise, leaving the redistribution of seats to be dealt with
in the following Session. Nay, more, they declined to give
any hint as to what form their proposal for redistribution
would take out of the many possible forms in which it
might be moulded ; except that Mr. Gladstone hinted at
the adoption of a principle of increasing the numerical
representation in proportion to the distance from the
metropolis — a principle which was afterwards characterised
by Mr. Forster as being an absurdity in the present
day, however proper it might have been in times of
slower and more difficult locomotion. It was evidently
impossible to predict with absolute certainty that
unavoidable accident might not prevent them from realising
their intention of carrying a Redistribution Bill in 1884, yet
Mr. Gladstone persistently refused to insert a clause in the
Franchise Bill postponing its operation until the measure for
redistribution should have passed. Had he consented to do so,
there would have been no serious opposition to this Bill in either
House ; but in the absence of that consent, the Conservative
party felt it their duty to resist it in the House of Commons. Mr.
Gladstone, however, had no difficulty in overcoming this resist-
ance with the help of the majority of the members who were
pledged to his support, and the Bill was sent up to the House
of Lords and came on for second reading in that House on
the 7th of July. The Ministry still withheld their consent to
the proposal, that when the Bill reached Committee a clause
should be inserted which should ensure that it should only
come into operation concurrently with the Redistribution Bill ;
and the majority of the Lords taking the same view as the
Conservative party in the House of Commons, instead of read-
ing the Bill a second time, passed the following Resolution : —

" That this House, while prepared to concur in the principles of repre-
sentation contained in this Bill, does not think it right to assent to the
second reading of a Bill having for its object a fundamental change in
the constitution of the electoral body of the United Kingdom, but which
is not accompanied by provisions for so apportioning the right to return
members as to ensure a true and fair representation of the people, or by
any adequate security in the proposals of the Government that the present
Bill shall not come into operation except as part of an entire scheme."

A few days later, in order to make it quite clear that their
action in declining to read the Franchise Bill a second time
was due not to any hostility to the extension of the franchise
or even to a desire to delay it, but simply to their objection to
the piece-meal method of legislation adopted by the Ministry,
the Peers passed the following further resolution : —

38 The Merits of the Case.

"That this House is of opinion that it would be desirable that Parlia-
ment should assemble in the early part of the Autumn for the purpose of
considering the Representation of the People Bill already presented to
Parliament in conjunction with the Redistribution Bill which Her Majesty's
Ministers have undertaken to present to Parliament on the earliest occa-
sion possible."

There the matter at present rests. The Lords have expressed

their intention of not passing the Franchise Bill until the

Redistribution Bill is also before them. The Government, so

far as present appearances go, are resolved to endeavour to

force them to do so. A few considerations will suffice to show

plainly on which side lie the merits of the dispute.

-,, ., J, This, it must be remembered, is not an

The merits of ,. ^ r ^i. tt tt j t •

the case. ordmary case 01 the Upper House declmmg

to proceed with a measure which has passed the

Lower House. The Bill in question is part of a measure

which is to effect an enormous change in our Constitution.

Would the Lords have discharged their duty to the country if

they had consented to pass this Bill without having before

them the whole of the measure of which it forms part ? The

answer cannot be otherwise than in the negative. In other

countries alterations in the Constitution can only be effected

with special solemnities and under careful safeguards. In the

United States such a measure as the Lords are being attacked

for not passing as a matter of course, would require to be

carried in the first instance by a majority of two-thirds in each

Chamber of Congress. It would then be submitted to the

Legislatures of the different States, and would only become

law if three-fourths of them pronounced in its favour. In

France, after being passed in both Chambers of the National

Assembly, it would have had to be considered by the whole

National Assembly sitting as one House, and would only have

been added to the Statute Book if a majority of the votes of

all the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies

counted together had pronounced in its favour. In England

we have no such elaborate constitutional safeguards ; whence

some of our Radical friends appear to think that, in the words

of Hudibras,

•'The Constitution was intended
For nothing else but to be mended."

To those of us, however, who do not accede to this view, it
will not appear unreasonable that the Lords, before assenting
to a part of the proposed amendment of the Constitution, should
have required to have the whole of it before them ; or that they

Coercion, 3j

should have declined to be parties to a course of action which
involved even the bare possibility that the redistribution scheme,
which formed the rest and the most important part of the amend-
ment, should be completed by a Parliament having the
members of its Lower House elected by constituencies which
had no place in the old Constitution, and were not intended to
exist under the new one. It is scarcely necessary to point
out that this indefensible result must have occurred, if by some
accident the Franchise Bill had been passed and had come
into operation, and the present Parliament had come to an
end, without its having been found possible to pass the
Redistribution Bill.

The Government were, in fact, fully alive to
this contingency, and their attitude towards it
furnishes a further and most complete justification of the
course adopted by the House of Lords. We have actually
heard from the lips of Ministers themselves, what in the
absence of their own confession we should hardly have ventured
to impute to them, that they deliberately intended to use this
risk as a means of forcing their redistribution scheme down
the throats of a reluctant Parliament. Mr. Gladstone first
threw a ray of light on this point. At a meeting of his party
at the Foreign Office, on July loth, 1S84, he said: — ''The
good will on the part of the Opposition, which we require in
order to give a Redistribution Bill a chance, cannot be had
unless they know that the extension of the franchise is to take
place, and that if they will not have it with redistribution,
they must have it without." Sixteen days later, at Man-
chester, Lord Hartington let the cat out of the bag still
further. His words were : — " We are all — Tories, and Liberals,
and Radicals alike — required to act in this matter under some
compulsion and under some stimulus, if within the next session,
or within the next Parliament, or within the next ten Parlia-
ments we are going to pass a Redistribution Bill. Therefore we
maintain that the compulsion and stimulus will be provided,
and can be provided only by the passing of the Franchise Bill,
which will induce men of all parties. Conservatives and
Liberals alike, to desire that the next and greater question of
Redistribution should be settled at once, should be settled fairly,
should be settled by the present Parliament." It is, then,
not the Upper House merely, nor the Conservative party
alone, but both Houses and both parties that the Ministry
are seeking to coerce. Nor is it them alone. Coercion

40 Coercion,

of Parliament means coercion of the country at large.
The Government deliberately intend that the nation should
be bound over, hand and foot, to swallow blindfold what-
ever new arrangement of the constituencies may best suit
the caprice of Mr. Gladstone or the deep designs of Mr.
Chamberlain. They pretend that their scheme of reform
is ardently desired and impatiently expected by the people.
Yet, so little confidence have they that their scheme, when
it is known, will be supported by public opinion, that
they desire to place the country under the necessity of accept-
ing it, before they disclose its details. " Surely," — as the
present Lord Derby observed in the House of Commons in
1866, with reference to this very course of proceeding, when he
took a different view of it to what he does at present — " surely
in vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird." The
Lords, by their recent action, have afforded to the people of
England an opportunity of avoiding the net; and if the people,
more foolish than the feathered race, reject this opportunity
and walk deliberately into the snare, it will have been their
own fault and not that of the Upper House. It is just
possible, though it appears hardly conceivable, that they will
adopt this course, and will even condemn the Peers for warning
them of their peril. But if they do, a day of bitter repentance
will surely come ; and, whatever may be the judgment passed
in the immediate present, the verdict of posterity will
undoubtedly be that, since the day when they caused the
Great Charter to be enrolled on the Statute Book, the Peers of
England have rarely done a more signal service to their
country than when they insisted that the Government scheme
of Reform should be dealt with as a whole, and should be
discussed by both Houses of Parliament, and by the nation
at large under conditions of absolute freeedom, and not in the
baleful atmosphere of coercion. .

Printed at the Fleet Printing Works, 14, WhiteLurs oticet, E.G.

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